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1P(WZR OF LSGILATURE TQ )REPIAL QR ALTER
A CORPGPATE FRANCJIISZ.
Although three-quarters of a century
hA passed, since this question came before the courts,
and although the most learned lawyersand disttmgu shed
judges, have given it their '"anxious consideration",r
It Still emainB unsettled.
It is a question peculiar to the
Ameriean courts, Although there may be English
authority which will help to throw light upon the
subject, no English cases in point have ever come
before the courts, There is nothing in the unwritten
constitution of Sngland,which in any way prevent.s
Parliament from repealing one day any statutecharter
or contraCt, that it enacted the preceding day. There
may be a political remedybut there is absolutely no
remedy in the eourts,
, he question ariises in this country,
under Article I Section 10. off the United States
9Oonatitution t which. says; "No~tate shall pass any law
imaoiring the obligation of contracts." Under this
section, has arisen a vast amount of litigaticn,which
cannot. be said to have gone very fartoward a settlement
of the controveray,- : The first time it came before the
courts was in 1308, in tho obscure case in Mlass,
There the legislature had granted a charter to a
corpozatIuon, ,permltting it to turnpike'a certain road,
andfor. compen&ti.-n to inaintain*certain toll gates
thereon. rhe defendant refused to pay toll 4and had
broken.down and carried,,away the gate '(on the .eorporat-
iorxs'bringing'an aetion in trespass ,the court said on'
this part icular pointf-" We are satisfied that the
right legally.vested in this or any corporation,cannot
be controlled or destroyed by any-subsequent statute,
unless a power for that purpose be reserved to the
legislature, in the act of incorporation." But the case
was-decided on another poirt and this was' only mere
dictun v ales v stetson( P .iase. 143.). This case
however is practically unkOwn fAEom the fact that the
leading su~hority was decided some twelve or fourteen
years afterwards, in the famous case known as the
Dartmouth Qolle~e Case, It first came before the
3New Hampshire courts, and was finally decided in the
Unit ed. Stat es 8upreme Court
A brief statement of the facts of that case
at this pcint.. is necessary .ometime prior to 1769
the Rev. rWheelock was a missionary among the
Indians, in the vicinity of New Hampshire. lie had
establiahed a school there for the education of the
Indian youth, and,'this in time out grew. the resourc es
at his command', He sent agents to England to solicit
subs802iptions , for the maintenance of the school, They
were sucessful in obtaining considerabie subscription
and in receiving a charter from George Third ,bearing
the date- Dec. 13, 1769. By this charter Dr. Wheelock
was made. presidont with the power of naming his
successor, The trustees were to corist of twelve men
who were named at the suggestion of Dr, W heelock,
Leven of whoja were to form a quorum ,and they had the
power of filling vacancies, that might happen from time
to t ime,
The object of the college was; ' for the
C}Y1JUi"eYL 0i" pag.a;t:; : s w'ell .s .n il line'-Li] :',_,]
4and sciences, and also of Inglish youthand others."
The college was: named by its charter "Dartmouth Colt
egew, ter the Harl of Dartmouth, one of its benefaoto-
rs It proceeded under this charter until June ?7th,
1916, when the legislature of New Hampshire passed an
act , reviving the charter. This act changed the
name from Dartmouth Uollegelto Dartmouth University. It
changed the number of trustees from twelve to twenty$"
one, a majority of whom were to form a qourum.
The Exaeutive was to appoint the extra number of
trustees, and fill any vacancies, that might occur
from time to time, It also gave the executive power
to appoint twenty,-five overseera, who were to inspect
and pass upon the acts of the trustees.
The old board refused to
recognize this as law, and would not act with the new
trustees. The new board with one Woodward as treas-
urer, got possession of the seal, books and other
articles of the college, and the old board brought an
action in trover for the repossession of the same.
ThG Case was carried up t;o the court of last resort,
in 1Jew Hampshire, and decided there in favor of the
n'ew board . Dazt mouth Cole v IVoodward. ( I N.H. Ill.)J.
6Richardson C. . wrote the opinion. He treats the
Corporation as being, a public institution and the
trustees as officers of the public only,having no
more private rights in the college funds than a
Uovernoar of the :Jtate,or a member of the legislature
has in the trut , which is given to his care, lie
claimr that the trustees will not be heard to saythat
their power must not be interfered with. "They are
servants of the publicand the servent is not to
resist the will of his master." He drew the distin-
c tion between public and private corporations, and
decided that the Dartmouth College was a public
corporation If it w'ere a public corporation ,as he
contended it waz, the corporation did not dppand, for
its identity, upon the number cr personae of its
trustees. It did not follow , thAEt becau:.e the
number of trusteeq wee changed ,that the corporation
was theIPeb ) disolved , No rights wez'e taken away
.om the old trustees ) they enjoyed the same rights as
they did before, the only difference ws that an
Increased number were on the same beard.
This legislative act neither dissolved
the old corporation, nor created a new one ° It left
the legal title of the corporate property in the
8trustees,, for the.benefit of the publict; and that was
just where it was before,
He repudiated the contract ide& all
together, and Qlaimed ,that the legislature had the
unquestiLunable right," to compel individuals to
become members of public corporations",such as towns
and villages, and if of towns or villages ,then why
not of the Dartmouth College? From this he draws the
conclusion, that the charter is no contract ,or at
leas tdo.not, necessarily ,enter into the charter
relat ions on their own com ent. The charter rights
are only4 rights under a statute 4and the legislature
is at liberty to repeal a statute et any time,
He then reviewed the question under
the bill of rights, which declares that, "no person
shall be deprived of his property,without due process
of lawA Under this he quotes Blackstone for the
proposition , that Parliarment can dissolve a corpora-
tion ty statute; also the analogous cases ,where
private lands have been taken for public highways,or
where legislaturee hove authorized the pulling down
of buildin~gs, t6 prevenit'the Spreaiig' of 'fire.
Acts have been poassed annexing two or more tovwns~an
theIz' validity has not been queationed. This clause was
7inserted In the bill of rights to protect the rights
of private individualstand never was intended to apply
to legislattuea in their control of public officers
and public corporations, In the management of public
be
affaira,legislatures must notAinterfer4d with- under
thia heado
The learned Chief oJustice then took up the
marraige contract , and argued that although this was
a contract, yet the state was allowed to interfere
and set the contraet aside under the divorce lawsand
no person was ever heard to say that tl-iS was within
the prohibition, of that part of the constitution
under coneideration. If the eou1t could interfere
with the marriage contraCtwhy could the legislature,
revise a charter?- iut he maintained that even if it
were a contract, neither the King nor the Legislature
had any power to make such a contract,binding on their
successors; they had no power to lay down any contract
that would prevent any subsequent legislature from
dealin with such +ubliI questions, as theymight deem
proper , or in other words they could uot pass an
irrepealable s tatut e,
The opinion then winds up with the
statement , that courts must distinguish between grants
to individuals and grants to the public at large.
if this ch-arter is a contract at allit is a contraCt
with a public cowern and may be revised ,to the
extent at least of changing the number of trustees*
By this decision the new board received the
full control of the affairs of the college. This case
attracted intense interest,not only in legal circles
but also in political. lhen the above opinion came
out' it received, it may be said, almost universal
approval. when (;hancellor Kent read it he expressed
himself as entirely satisfied with the holdi.ngand
gave it his hearty approval, Even ebster,,who was the
coure el for the plaintiff,was forced to admit that it
waA a very Ingenlous decision,
It must be said here,however-that the
above brief statement of the ruling of the New Hampshire
court, gives much more attention to the contract
theory in proportion ,than was given in the opinion
for the reason that the contract theory is the essential
part of this article As a matter of fact neither the
c ounsel or the court seemed to place imuch stress upon
this. This mnust be rioted here for it will be seen in t1e
next opinion that it wias practically the keynote of
9the whole case.
After the decision was given it was decided
by the cold board of trustees , to carry the caseup
to the supreme uourt of the United tates, In orier
to d4 this, the only point that it could beAthere ongwas
on the question, ;da.hether the acts of the 
legisfJi @
impaired the obligation of contracts, ,Webster was
anxzous to have other points on which it might. be
repealed, and for that reason advised that suits on
other points of law should be prosecuted in the Circuit'
court, in order that they might be brought before the
supreme court at the same time, in this however he was
Uns UC C ess ful
The case in the Supreme court is
reported in 4 Wheaten 511-, The upinionss were written
by arshall, .J.pktory, 1U, and ijashinrton,J , Here the
case was decided sjquarely on the contract theory. The
arguments of the decision can be divided into these
two heads; - First, ias the chart er of the Dartmouth
Vollege a contract? econd Did the acts of the
Legislat ure im.pair the obligat ions; of that contact?
As to whether the char-ter w .. , a cont ract
or not depended on whether the Dartmouth Qollege was
a publi4 or private institution, arid the cour-t decided
1C
that it was a private irstitution,
The opinion of the Supreme court argued ;
that Dr. heelock, a private individual~wa s the
founder of the college. He er his- agents for him
had solicited subscripticns for this college,, The
benefactors had gi;en their aid to the college with
the understanding, that a corporation should be
formed , and that the institution shold be carried
on, on the principles that Dr. 2eelock had laid down.
.he benefactors were all private individuals ; they gave
tc Dr. Wfheelock or to the corporation whioh he was
tc form , and not to the government or king. So far
then everthing thot had been done , was done by
pr1vate individuals. Qf course it might be said that
the .:ork was of a public nature and it certainly was
a charity that was for th general publi.c; but it did
not make the founders public men,- simply because they
,iere rontributirng to a public charity° If Drw kheelock
ad. crrtinuedto carry on the "work alone, he could
not WtAve been calle, a public man on that account or
fro;a that have lost the power tc. regulate the college
accordin~; to his ovwn methods. If thqen the college
;:vs private up to the ti, e of ineorooration ; did the
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fact that the king had ircorporated it ,make it a
public institution? The court held that it did not.
It merely gave this body of men the power of succession
by which they could, by fillt any vacancies that
might occur from time to time, continue forever.
They are as much a private institution now as they
were before incorporationand the college is as much
a nrivate college now as it was before.
Now comes the question ; was the act of
incorporation a contrac? This the court answered
in the affirmatiie .1The trustees of the college
had agreedthat if they were incerporated and given
certain privilegeSathey would in return give a certain
sum, and arry on the college in a certain manner.
This ,xas a contract and irrevocable by the govornmenb -r
The government had given thousands of grants of
land throughout the countrybut no one was ever heard
to sair that it could repeal these grants and turn the
land over to other parties. The same doctrine would
apply to charters. By this charter the king had
granted certain privileges , and the legislature
would not now be heard to say,~ that it had the power
t6 repeal that charter and turn those privileges over
12
to strangers in direct opposition to the stipulation
made by the donor. The argumentthat there was no
consideration , does ntbt change the situation a If the
king made a gift of land to his subjectsand their
right under that gift had become vestedhe could not
repeal that gift and turn it over to some other man.
But this charter was not in the form of a giftthere
was a consideration . Dr. dheelock gave up his own
interest in the collegeand the donors paid In their
money in consideratiow20bf the charter.
The next question to be answered
was the contract obligat ion, under the charter ,
impaired? This question the court also answered in
the affirmative. v hen the bebefactors paid their
money to the institution they paid it with The
understanding , and in consIderationthat the college
should be under the control of the incorporated trustees.
They did not consider ,t.hat the king or the legislature
had anything whatever to do with the college. In fact
N w Hampshire was never in the minds of any of the
founders, arr more than this; that somewhere within
its borders there happened to be a favorable place for
such a college, but± it would not have made ,a particle
13
of difference to the charter, if the college had been
located in i\ew York Georgia or any other state oft the
unicn, ey paid theitn, on the cons lddie%,zz -thh
the college should be run as provided by the charter,
not aa the legislature or as the king proposed to run
it. ut the legislature of New Iampshire had stepped :h
and said, that this-college must be managed in a
differnt manner and had taken upon themselves the
responsibility of saying how it should be managed.
This, the court declared ,was in direct opposition
to the contract obligation of the charter&
The court also took up the argument
under the marriage contract law, vtrhich had been used
y th,apshIre court. This court saidthat the
Il-h d Nw '-,= oaita h
law did riot iLapair the obligation of the marriagetby
granting a divoree, but only relieved the innocent
party when the other party had broken his or her contract,
The courts rmmrely declared that the contract had already
been broken and set it aside.
Cther miner rYrg'nents were taken
up and d~s~oaed of, but enough hap been given to
indicate the stand, ,t~ the court tcco: on this
question and their reasons for so rulirgo
14
Then, after all the learning and labor,that has
been bestowed upon this questionit becomes a settled
question that a charter is a contract, There is
pro~abl no Case in the history of all the American
Courte,that is more famous or more celebrated than this
one. If the case was not correctly decided pit cannot
be 8aid that it was on account of the lack of legal
talent. There is probably no period in the history
of the United ;tates0 that could have produced more
learned counsil or judgesthan those who took part in
these two casea,
4e said that the New hampshire opinion
met with general approval throughout the country, and
it would seem from that ,that the supreme court
decision must have met with general disapproval.
but strafe to say , that was not the caze, Kent was
complet ely won over Jebst e~s powerful argtuent ,and
declared that the New Hampshire court was wrong.
In fact the two Courts.although
arriving at directly opposite resultsdid not differ so
very much, upon principles of law. About the only
difference in the argument of the two courts was ,that
the 1 e hampshare courts Conszicered the D~wttmouth Colleg e
15
a public institution, and the supreme cou, considered
it a private College..
It is a gact worth mentioning here,but
our linited space will not allow um to enter intto
details, that the interest in this ce,°e waS"not by
any means limited to legal circles. It became a
pclitc-al, question between the two political parties,
the Federalists9 and Demoerats, .and the question was
hotly eontested, outside of the court, Political parties
were not slow to make use of it, and the people were
naturallya excited over the result of the trial.
Marshall was a staurch Federalist,. and 'Pbster was not
bsekw"rd in using this weapon to its utmost capacity.
After havir rpreaented te legre.l side of hls caseOhe
boldly but delicately tock up the serrtimental7 and even
the political, viewof the situation,,and wit> his
powerful eloquence held the court spellbound. That
this had a mighty influence on .arshallfthere can be no
doubt; some believe that thi-,* part of l3ebster's speech
won him the Ase.
That the decision ;mmgeneral approval
there can be little doubt. As was said before Kent
16
heartily approved of it H e said of this aase afterwai
" It xontairw one of the most full and elaborate
expositior ,of the constitutional sanctity of contracts,
to be met with in any of the reports. The decisions
in that ease did more than any other single act ,
proceeding from the authority of the Uhited States,
to throw an impregnable barrier around all rights, and
frarchises, derived from the grants of the governmert,
and to give solidity, and inviolability to the literary,
charitable, religousw, and commercial Institutiong, of
our coUvt.ry. w
A& the country advanced in commaercial
enterprise and power , this opinion decreased in favor,
instead of increasing. At that. time Corporations
were looked upon as a boon to the country, Rail-
roads were to be built and with them came banking ,
steamship, telegraph and scores of other corporations,
which were absolutely essential to develop this great
eountry. Corporations were practically the only
institutions by which these ent erprises could be carried
out. The governments of the several states, were not
only willing to give them oharters but also to give
them almost anyv inmunity they might ask for. The
result was that before tong they out grew the wildest
17
expectations of their friends , and the states soon
wokt# up to the fact , that they had created creatures,
that were soon to rival them in their sovereignty.
Then, and not till thenlegal authorities began to
complain of this decision. Thenthey began to believe
that the Supreme court had erred, Dnd then all sorts
of criticism began to appear.
lar, Cooley writing nearly fiftTr yeors after
this say s: " It is under the protection of the
decisfion of the Dartmouth College Casethat the most
enormous and threatening powers in our country have been
crea"ted, some.of-the great and 7-.eathy corporations,
hav,- a gr&ater influence in the country at largeand
upon the legislation of the count rythan th states to
which they ove their corporate existence. 2very
privilege grated or right conferredno matter by what
means or on what pretersebeing made violable by
the constitution , the govE i:ment rs freciently found
stripped of its authority ilvery import3ant particulars,
by umvire, careless or corrupt legrslation,and a clause
in the federal constitution who.e purpose aa to
preclude the repucliation of debts and just contracts
protects and erpetuat es the evil."
18
Ohancellor ient and Mr. Cooley are two of-the
very beat authcrities that can be cited on this or
even on any subject,.nnd their expres 'ion on the case
ought to be excellant indication of the conclusion to
be drawn tromthe case ,e a it a seen in their
respective periods. As has been pointed out by James
A. Garfield, Chief Ostice .1.rshall %rote hir oinion
"the year before th', steomn railway wav born",and it is
certain that heo1 the Chief Justiee,1 @ not the slightest
idea into what depths the doctrine,he then laid down,
was aft6r'wards to lead the states. arfield together
with many other critics,seems to think that if the
Dart.mouth College Case had come up fiftyv years later,
that it wculd have been decided differently,
( Legal! Gazette,,40o)~
That this case was n Irm-nenp boon to
private ccrr crations ,there can be no do ibt, in the
earlier days of this cctuntr¥j, legislatures re'garded
corpcratio n, as n absoute e sential to tVe opening
uI o this :on I  and extensive coIIlrtryand in this
they were undoubtedly correct. They did every thing in
their power to enc oursge corporaticns,never thinking th
19
the dal wo uld co me, when thej woul d rue the ir rash
liberally, Railroads were given large tracts of land,
which were to be free from taxation. They were by their
charters,allowed to fix their own ratesof compensation
and in many cases theO were assured that no competition
should be allowed. All these and many more iymunities
were showered upon corporations, which were afterwards
looked upon a, monsters7 by those who had brought theta
into exiatence, As they began to grow. wealthy, and
increase in powergthen the reaction seG in. AS the
West became settled, railroad land increased in value,
and as the corporations increased in we.lthso they
increased in influence with the legislehtures. They
were able.t legialatuee either legitimctely, or by
means of briberyto grant them still greater favors.
hen people woKe up to the danger before them, they
naturally looked to the legislatures for redress,but
redreas was made imposible, by the principle that was
laid down in this leading case. Then ,anid not till then,
did the people cole to the concl~sionthat the Dartmouth
College Case ;vaa wrongly decided. Critics seem to think,
that if marshail had foreseen the strides that corporstI
one were to make and had ; nown the mighty influence
P0
that they were to wield he would have decided differently.
How that would have been of cour s it is impossible to
say.
That this theory of the lawhas led to
serious complications, ia no argument that it was a
wrong theory. If the decision was correct when it was
written,,it is still correct, notwithstanding the fact
that it has led to serious difficulties, The @ou'did
not attempt any more than any court zt trucmpt orat.ttempt
to decide- net only for that particular. case but for all
cases that might arise for centuries to Come. It
decided the case then before it on the principles of
law, as they appeared at that ti me ; if the decision was
rightS'then it is right no . If the custcms of the times
have changed the business S. -. I '- . , that is not
the-fault of the -arto uth College C e.he.ere was
a time , when the law demanded the greatest diligence
froj conmon cariie:s, it held thea responsible for all
I
loss , except the at of God and the public enemies.
idow this liability has been reduced to ordinnry
diignc 4 ~bfh', Ofe?:oUld" 'ay the old theory
in these aa eswas. al ; r ,- and th e new 1.l .s all
right. hoth laws a.re correct in their own day and
generation. T&his 'ould seem to be thc view under the
21
Dartmouth Oollege Case. ocircumstanoes have changed
and these changes in commercial life of course demand
changes in the law. But if the Supreme 0ourt had
foreseen the danger that was to ariseand had given
their decision the other way ; would the country be
better off today ? It seems that that would be very
doubtful. The great corporations that are raising the
trouble today are the railways. low thee roads ,all
must admit, were the primary agents to openup the
vast*. regions of the western country. Had there been lc
railways, it. is doubtTul if there would be today any
Ohicagof #St,, Paul or hundreds of other citiesthat dot
the weetern states. These railroads were built at the
expense of millions of dollars. All were undertaken
at immense risks , without any forecast of how they
would.turn out. If .added to these,. natural risks,
corporations w.ere compelled to proceed with these
enterprises , wit-h not, the lir;htest assurance that the
charter would continue even a single weekcan.it be
said that these men would have undertaken 1uch risks
under such precarious circumstances ? No country
understands better than Arerica today, what crisis it
may be broughat to by changes or uncertainty in her
tariff policy. People or Qapitalists may believe that
22
a nev administration will give them a better tariff
policy, than the previots one, but the feeling of
unCertainty forbids them investing their money in
expernsive ent erpris esIuntil they have some assurance of
the groun they are standing on.
The same is true of corporations.
If one aministrction believed that a certain railroad
would open up a new country and gave a charter to a
railroad company fol that purpose ; would any::
Judicious eaptilist iivest thousands or millions of
dollars in that enterprise,with no assurance that the
next administration, ywhich would in all probability
come into power in a year or two, would not have a
different railroad Dolicy and repeal their chart er$
Enterprise is the great essential
to progress, but there can be no enterprisewhere
there is no stability of policy. In a democratid
country of this kind nothing is more uncertain than
public opinion, today the people may demand a certain
trade policy, and within a year be clamorina for
sorne ot} er policy. It may he un~merican to say so~but
recent events in the political history of this country
leads one to doubt if' thze masses are always the best
23
udges of their own wants. But-however this may be it
seem plain, that no corporation will launch out on
a great enterprise with no asurance that they may
not be cut off in a. single night.,
24
QHAR FA3 SUBJEOT TQ TE POLICE POWER.
But although the main principle can be approved
in the ".artmouth College Case, it rumt be taken with
several important limitation ; and the first of these
is police power. Jecause a charter is given to a
corp( -raticn , it is not to be deemed that it has any
greater liberties than individuals,unless they are
expresly sta,.ted in the charter, And it ought to be
mentioned here that the mere fact that there is a
charter, does not imply that there must be a contract.
T,>ere .2ht be an exor ed contract in the charter or
none will be Iimlied froM the mere fact that thexis
a charter. Stone V. IviG9. 4 01 U.. 16).
There is no peculiar sanctittr at.tachin to this
ar-tificial beingor to its nrooerty,tat does not also
attach tz. nvtural persons."( Leach on Corporations.Sc.22)
It has been many .times heldboth,in the
several state courts, and in the United StateS 8upje7-te
Court, that the fact that a corporation has a charter,
does not in any 4ay-discharge that eorpo~at ion from
the police power of the state. Their charter makes
them art if i~ial beings, but gives them no immunity
whatever from t1he laws that are made for the general
25
public. There i3 no trouble on this point in the
case4- the only question is, what is within the police
power?
This question caes up in Atiassachusetts, aa
to whether the legislature could prevent a corporation
from manufacturing and selling malt liquors. The
court said- " the company under its charter has no
greater right to manufacture or sell malt liqturspthan
individuals possess, nor is it exempt from any
legislative control therein to which they are subjeet,
All rights are held subject to the police power of the
atate."' Beer Co, v Mass, ( 97 UOSW 3204
The state of iAississippi passed an act
abolishing all lottery and gambling institutions.
A lottery company had previously received a charter to
carry on a lottvry business in that state,on the passing
of' this act , this comp any set up their charter as a
defence. The court said : o" legislature can bargain
away the public health or the public oralh. The
people themselves cannot do it, much 1les their servants."
Stone V Liss. ( Lil U.S. 314,).
2everal other such cases have come up that
give cormparatively lit tle trc.uble. For" instance, it has
been held that telegraph and telephone companies,whose
28
Wires and posts xe become a nuisance in the streets of
cities , are subject to police powers.
Uni(,n Mut. Tele. Co. v Chicago ( 16 Fed. Ren,,3O9.
But th6ve is a certain line of cases known as
" THe Granger Cases", which have not been so easily:
settled. Gne of theme was Miunn v Ill. iunn constructd
his warehouse In 1862, In 870 Ill, drew up a new
constitution which among other thingsdeQlared that all
elevators Situated in any city having over one hundred
thousand inhabitantsshould be considered as public
buildings, and Subject to the "control of the state
legislatureo In 1g71,the legisliture passed an act
requiring all elevators in the citles of over one
hundredi' thousand t;o securebefore continuing business,
a license from the circuit Court. It also regulated
the prices to be charged by these elevators,and laid
down other minor detE;il:),. The prevailing opinion decid-w
ed that elevators become in a sense public propertyand
as such, becomie subject to public control.
It held, that " the legIslatu1e had the povr
to regulate and to provide rules and regulations." mo
this decision there was however a strong dissenting
opinions by dustice Fielr,and 1ustice S~trong. They held
27
thatObecause private buildings are deemed by the constitution
to be public buildirs, it does not follow that they are
public. beaauoe a warehouse is used for storing grain ,does
Ao* make it a public building any more than renting a tenement
house makes it a public building, 1'"ey claimed that the
warehouses in question were privete przopertyand as such the
legislature had nm right to interfere ,they would be depriv-
inr the company of property without &uL e pocess of law.
This case did not involve corporationsbut several eases
followed iniediately after which were decided on the same
grounds, and they were so irtmediatey connected ,aa to be
almost analogous. The first of these cases was Chicago RJ. Co
v Iowa ( 4 U.. 1551)
,he state of Iowa passed an act regulating the
transportation rates of freight and passengers of railroads
within the state. The company complained that this
interfered witL its private ights , and that it was contrary
to the constitution ,and brought suit to enjoin the Attorney
eneral frora prosecuting themi for violating that statute0
The charter was given subject "te such rules aM
regulations as the general Assembly of lowa might from time
to time enact and providle." The court held that this was
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a imilar case to' unn v 111. and under that deacision was
subject to legislative controlas to rateR of fare and freight,
unless protected by its charters. The court agreed that the
charter of the company was a contract subject only to any
reservation in the charter itself, or in the general statutes
ol constitution before the charter was given. But the court
maintained that under the reservation clause they were
subject to the-same contlril as private individuals and would
not be allowed to charge iwre than a reasonable sum for
carriage or f~eight . The count argued that this worked no
injustice to the corporation because they took the charter with
their eyea open, and if they did not want to risk the
legislatures fixing their rates they ought not to have taken
the charter, Thisopinion was written by chief Justice
Field and- strong.
Practically the Same case arose in Pike etc, R.R.
( g4 u.s. 165, ). The opinion of this case was written
Co.
by Ukhief ?ustice djaite, and dissented from by the same two
W
usticea as the preViouS Case. Another point was settled
in this c se, namely thAt II when property has been clothed
with a public interest the legislature may fi a limit to
that~whiCh shall in law be rea.sonable for its use. This
limit binds the courts wJ wellas the people."
Several other cases ,that are almost
CO04 %'-
identical , follo in succession,the same ,ustice writing the
prevailing .pinions and the ceme tto dissenting
Ohicagov :"ilvau~lee et4, i . v.CQ,  Ackley ( 94 U.S.
Ninona and StoPaul ... lake ( 94 U.S. 190).
Stone v disconsin ( 94 U.S. 1ql, ).
Dunbar v Lieyers ( W4 U.84 ....- - - ,  A
These cases would seem to have gone almost as far
as it was c*rsible fcr a court to g, and not overrule the
leading case. They certainly left very little of the origral
case standing , but they were not to atop here. The question
next came up in the state of Mississippi. There the
legislature passed an act creating a: ilroad Commission ,
"charged with the general duty of preventing the exaction
of unreasonable or discrirninating rates,upon the trarsportation
done within the limits of the State, and with the enforcement
of reasonable police regulaticns, for the comfort ,convenience
and safety of travellers9a n d persons doing businerss with the
company w-ithin the State." Suit was brought to enjoin the
cornMnission fr om carryin out the provisions of the statute.
£Pilroacl Commission Cases C 10 U. 3. 307,).
The court sustained the legislature,Chlef
ustice jate writing the prevailing and Justicesliarland
and Field dissenting. The prevailing opinionl took up very
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..itle-that had not been gone over before. The Chief
Justice cited the granger canes and claimedthat " the
power of legielation (that is the power to regulate
charges) is a power of government continuing in its
nature , and if it can be bargained away at all it can
only be by positive ords of grant *or something which
in law is equivalent " The charter of the railroad
company granted the cornorat i the tI-O7e ,"from time to
time to fix,regulate and receive the toll anc- chargesaby
them to be received for transportation etdc ,.ut the
court mintrdned that this power was given with the
St ,uiation that such refulation mtk be reasonabletand
the legi atire wa the proper authority# to ay
whether or notircertain rates were reasonable. "The right
to fik reasonable charges has been ",ranted,btft the power
of declarin; what ;hall be deemed reasonable has not
be n surrendered,"
roJtUtice rland ,in his dissenting opinion1
vigorously uoheld the coroorations. -e claimedthat the
eases wore not within the rule of the Uranger Cases.
The Grariper charters were received with r'easonable
clnissremerving the right of th ,e le~islature to reieal
c a1ter the chacters4 bix with the charter in question
no such reservat Ion was inserteado The chart ers expressly
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dea1ared, that the corporation should have power "to fix,
r.-egulate and receie the toll and charges." From this
he argued, that the management of the road was taken
from the corpration ,and Placed 1-n the hands of the Rall
oad ComitsiCOn, :r maintag fe t
..... "", .... o dd-ing t6he lepr i
ure had impaire_ t.e obligation o,_ l e contracts
contained in te chart or and -h.: vi lated t e rights of
t 7-e cororat ,>n
Thee cases crtaInly ., ett.tng far away
from tbe doctrine in t e eriginal c ebut the Supreme
Cour t maintained , that they r.t hb d
thet rincileahero laJd dn
i -na chaert e 4 o c .k iuLjt o be rubject to police
o- v er' tVee can be "no 3eriuA obj ect nI. But as to the
" e. aer C ane, d the Comrssi on UasCt seE ",theIe is
undoC d y oo- fo 4.a- to whether they are logical
; no t. trane to sLy they a o rsee b- te same
criti.cs vh< o:QIe the Dlrtmnut> olege C:-,e. They
, that these ca cz are opposed. to the settled law
.a i irtfe rr tt va  it , hey lso ray t hat
- " : ie -,t 1, "~i I §"elt a'"air lirg cc~ a-r t -",or
especially :L:i the , est~btt to a Fgreat e -tenit all over the
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countryo This does not seem to be a very serious charge.
A$ was pointed out before* what. "ras public policy or a
(ublie necessity fifty years age , in not so now. Fifty
year-S ago corooration , especiall,, railroad coroorations
wcre alcs' an absolute ti-ecesit- n it was absolutely
es that tn'ey srcul1. be enco .- f-gedbut now they
'lave becouxe strone enoL.,. to loo >iut for themselvest
i&deed. t e) rev-e completely e ers ecl thoir pcsition, and
are nowfse fa' from being wards in t -f hands of the
diiffeent statesthey ia-e rices t-o o.ition where
they can even dictate to the scvereignty of the differrnt
st ateS. i do not see whly courts shoild 0 be condenm i-,
if they do not iea,8on in the same way with regard to
corporatioi tcday, as their pred-eceorxcs did forty or
fift years ago. io one woul ,wi th cO;i:n sense
wa:intain, that the s aie ,s should be applied to the
raiLroads of tcday, as as applied to the f;tage coach
of the t U7ourts hoiuld adrap;t ieei;.:o8l' .o the
existing state of society and net give too strict an
adherence to u ele~s f~r.a aa,?&d to different circturn-
s t anc e.s* , al wcrt:_, V hoyt, (~ ', * G., ,,. ).
L. a ofl t pu ,mlic ;. l:C & e:unded that
railways ahould be fQst(. red ,rndi now scciet.y demancls~that
tsey Should eceive a differnt, treatmentae the cou-ts
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wrong and to be condemned because they do rot folloW
a atrict.y logical view and carry out the old theory 9
ne u t-0ice tor-y 'rote hi3 concurring opinion
iL- the Catxc It (ollege Qase, he intix.ated3 that the
legi.lature might eserve the rif t to repeal a charter.
tartuth College v .Jooduard ( 4 .4heatton 673,,
Th: suggestion wa-; sioon acted i pon bj the
dtf 2flt states&, J-LA6& niov one is safe in s ing that
every itate arznts its charters subjeoct to the r'ight
of l egi~Tature tc a~n1,repeal or alter at any time that
it may see )rofi r. ih±s righ~t-to repeal has been
upheld by alL th-. ccurm, if one party is willing to
enter into a contract on the condition,that the other
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party may repeal that contract at an:; time, the courts
will not after; allw hiti to dispute the right to act
on such condition. jC o es ino the contract ,'Ath
h112 eyeL open iand rust abide by it.
.his# reservation ; be- made in the
stittt1. of a ,itate, in a eu n.-rl tat t or in the
chxatwer it:;elf. * }henover it is madcpit i; binding upon
th-e partiest it i generIll made in exglit language
but A :ie c ; es hold, that rerervat ion i-c!.y be implied
froi the laI ;uage used.
ren jyvania joll. as ( 15 a all, %,)
i, , words are necessry -f it apoears that
the Drtlo tnder ta-d t ">t. , co",t a c tey are ent eringi~t e and of c '.. " Ae m Oi l ! m -. .
...and c .n t - n differwwce hether
t -e cr .-e-a i c - a1 7. 1 - k, .;t ,i f h e e  i ath~e corpcrat:' " r] ctuwtll .'i~~;z ,Ifte.ei
reservatili,, c !aue " r . ,,,eneral-f- tu'tA,cr -- e constitut-
I 0 ,1741 1)t1"1eU.4- 1 2.l b e g ec u -. c-du, c.- ,. cie l . .
re erv nc.ti aan tlausc the ;4t ae o r t ... eal or
alter a ce-,,rate franchis, but ther. , i, mch ccnfu- e
-c~ ast ' e,;en th, a C, r~ 't i on .n&; i nte rf ere
";:-th. co-r.x .rtionu business, Uc. wel! definedI line can be
drawn liMt in§; legisiative int er-fereic'e.
The cases uniformnly hold that the
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reservation of the r*ght to appeal ,enables a
legislature to destroy the life of a corporation and
forbid it continuing the corporate buosiness.
4imball v .x A. R. eCoo ( 7 ' N.Y, 569*),
It is also granted , that the stafte has the right to pass
laws, controling the domectic affairs of the corporation.
,unn v 11. ( 94 U.. 113, ).
But this mst be very near the limit of nower.
Legislatures cannot make voidwhat the corporation has
already done. It cannot declare contracts void which tlee.
corporation has entered into4  It cat not take away
prcperty or rights f %.Thich have already become vested.
This question came up in the , ichigan court
in City of Detroit v De-.roit Faulkrod do. (43 Mich.
JAQ, ). -here the que;t I r aro  ohether no  t the city
had po':;er to compel the cor.oratc; to remove toll gates
fromm the city4 which it had out there ,ith the sanction
of its charter. dge Cecley Uaintained it had no
Such power, as that would be interfering with vested
rights t .1 said: tit is immaterial in what w y the
pro Qoerty was la- fuliy cuired , whether bi: la.bor in
the rdiaryavocti~n ,of ltfeby , ift or descent or by
maki.ng S profi~h e u e of a franchise granted by
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the state t it is enovh that it has become private
property and it thus protected by the law of the land,"
Judge LiAller see m to '.ave laid Corn the law on this
matter,ihen he said: "Dersonal and real prooerty
acquided by the ccrpo'ations during- its lawful existence
rigts of contract or choes in actin,so acquired and
which do not in their nature, depend upon the general
power conferred by the chalvterr are not destroyed by such
repeal." (Gieenwvod V rei ht Coo ( k5 U. . 13,)w
The leading cases in ew YoYrk -on thiz -ubjcmay
be said to have practically settlod this quec tion; it is
People v '10ri'in III ,Y. i, j.
The IroadwayS - Irface :tailroad Co -. ,1:Ar ircorp-
orated nder te st atutes of iei; York. It obtained
au rit from the city of 1"?ew Yo %'0 to lur tracks and
ran cars ver Lroadway. This it (-d Ai ,mcrtaeod its
road to scure ce I tain loar o ; then the Iejslature
pse aeL w repealing th chaer, and reqi1iring that
the Att0rner! Qenex l Shoild bri , a t to >,ave a
receiver aN:,oint ed anrd the h-sinn -Ju:r. i oI I The
cour held Zu ,i an act .... c itto t.n cKd
The city hL& given the coimpany an vulim ;ited franchise,
to run it5 cars overt its ztreets , nd suc> right became
vested . It held that the tracks so Thid and the
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frarchis to use them were inmeperable and could not
be teaken from the corporation. Under a reservation
clause in the corntitutionthe legislature had nower
to revoke the charter, ond deprive the corporation of
rL~e , but had no r-ight to approoriate its prcperty.
Its pro;e rty by iVew iork statute would go to the
Iirectors , as trustees for the creditors and stock-
holders, and the legislature had r power to take pontrd 1
of the propertzy, any more than it has to take control
of oroperty of a deeeased person. Tohe franchise of
the corooration was invested with the character of
property and a ....su:h could not be taken away by
le:i , lature or any other authorit y. The franchise and
other property was a trust find for the payment of
credit ors, and the oolirt insisted that it aught to be
used for that purpose.
The sre question came up in another
form in New ersey in the case of Labiskie V Hackensack
IS . q. 13 ). In 356, the h-ackensack and N.Y.R.
R. Co. i-ri incorporated tc build a railroad a specific
cdistar :e, in 1861 it received a euo'olemerit to this
charter, t o have the road extended. The coinlainant
:yas a stockholder ,and brought~ this sutt,to have the
company restrained f 1 tending its road, claiming
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that he became A stocllder with the umderstanding
tht t.e roa should be built as the charter stipulated.
A majority of stoc1holders ctnnot change the nature of
t e bu inens. '2ie coowt eld that a state,:hen such
1.n 0wer har been re.-rved,Iay repeal a co'~;rate charter,
but it ca1rot interfere 7Jith the rights of third
partiesa it h no povier to violate the contracts
entered into by the corporation as one pa-rty and its
CO rorators ac the otheJo It held ther4for0,that
t-is supplemeritary charter cvo dvid.
The co',u of ilew *or', .ad ilass. disagr@e
with1.1 i c r;e, and raintain that the legislature may
extend . railroad or" any ct r b i.dneqsand not vdolate
the contracts of third partie-s. heA; do not differ
CXI ~T.h. genercl porinrioie hci:ever, thaz the legislature
carn.not ntezrfere with p)rivat e t hts but ma.iintain
t.t enrsTLon, of a -.ailra y doe not chane :.cw he
11.4ure cof the biuzine-,. oth courts unite in s ing
that legzislatures !f.all not gc sc far,~ o uhrz
enterprises and operation.s ,dliff,;rent in their_ nature,
and kind fr a these comorehe2dec i the orlr inal
charter." )uiiee v la Clony ..tc .co. ( 3 Allen 2n3%. )
Jhte v o3:,Taduse Utica ,J C( 14 Barb, 560).
The extent of legislative power came up in
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(alafornia in Spring Valley J. v San Francisco ( 61 Cal,
3, . This company obtained a charter ,to supply
the city of San Francisco vtth xter .-y the charter
it w3 arraned th;-I the Cor any. should appoint two
corntiiosicners , and the city ho d appcn tvo and
these four would arrange the ;ater rates. Aferwards
the le(7irlature amended the charter and rave the
E-parvi soe of the Courty and city -wer to fix the
rates. The comany coirlained tha t this was inter-
fer ingvith thPirar i-t sbut the court maintained that
the leislature had. a perfect ri.h to make this change.
There are ni-nerous other creAs on this
subj ect that are imrvortant, as showin how far
le.izlature is juFtified in interferkng with oe. t..e
c..rrorate busine#s, but eno'uh hag been given to show
the extent of its power . But there F." yet ,two
casesi without which , this list would not be complete,
namrelv the Sinking Fund uaes ( -e U.sS .7"U,) ,and
kcJ e v , ashington University, ( 3 JAll ,
In 1.6), the United States Covern-
T 00nt chaTtered the Uniori Pacific .+..o, and in 1364
a2Oended its chart er,° Both chart er aumd amendment reserved1
the ri .Yt t o 4r'eal. !hbis cormany was to construct
a road through a certain t erritoy~and was to render
4c
s ervices to the United itates overnu ent.:en called
iipoon to do so. In order to help the cozapany
along , the gover.me3nt i..:. d bnds T.:hich were to be
paid up in thv.rtI .rears !n 13173,the road
carried troc , cver 4ts line Ocr the goverrrneit ,and
sent in it, bill for conmoensat n. The Government
rp>.sed an act , declariig that ,art of t _s sum should
apply to intere.t due on the bond,and the .ether part
be put into a sinking fund , to, be .polied tc t, he paym ent
of the bonds, ..hen they fell due. -le coLany maintain-
ed4 that ti w o a viclz,. ti 'n f their cntractthat they
had no right to pay ";' ,e bonds, funtil the ell due. But
the court muintained ,thouc' not ,it'. t trongop dissent-
~in, o~inicns that t> is caie :ithin the powers reserved.
T-ey held th'at this was not a pa-menrt o the debtbut
mereltr a fund which the ailrat, ought oi their own
account to institute in crder to meet the debt,when
it fell due.
In 4 ashington Universitv V lkme ( all,
S ). a somewhat differ nnt vies came un. T.h ie ..
bniver "ity in 18353. Wher e vwaz a r' oner al st atut e, on the
statute bocii, at the time~vwhich, reserved the right
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to repesl, all all subsequent charters. The charter of
the laahingtornniveroity dc-ec1redthrat the oro)erty
Should be eonmipt from taxation, and expretsly declared
tI at thi charter iho ild not be ubj ct to the reserva-
ti'n clause, in the general stat ite. In 1365,the
legislature declared that thiz pronerty ehould be
taxed.The corporation et uo the, chartenr as a contract7
, and received a verdiet. This far the . is not
inuuSual, d t ustic e ll.r wrote ,. di nt Yr coinion,
which may be said to have received the provalfof a
,-%c-T, .f the p.rofe!s.ionq , -id even of the
COLL". 4 +the oreccents are the other way were too
strong and n.ierous , for anyl of the courts to follow
out lh th eor -
out h t or e ih . i  "zntP.ined, that -hp legislature
had no pc;';er to gprant away the r,, of t_.ativn.
If the:: could exempt one piece of nzo-ertythey co.ld
ex ont anc.ther ,well,zand in tC.4. 4., " tr h
govern., e , ,hih 1h t ey ,ere appointed tc..;e.1w. t  e
went cn to sho:;, that if the 1egirUlature coId exemot
property fr i taxaticn,they would be oontrolie by the
rich, and in timet taxes would b -1. vaid 1 n f.nly,,,by the .oo.r.
l~e w'Ound ixc zi - c,.-.pnon by thtscng -ua,: "
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of legislative bc,dies, which c n never be clo-edby the
decisions of the court,and that te one we h1ave here
cca'idered,is of this characte~o :, e are strengthened in
this viewof the Subject,by the fact that a series of
dissents.frrom this doctrine, by some of our predecessors,
show that it never has received che full assent of this
court; and refering to those dissents for more elaborate
defence of our viewswe content r.uselves with" t}.I
i'eviewing the ; rotet against a dcctrin- ':hish we thinW
must finally be abandoned."
These cases give some idea of the extent
of >owers that leGislatures may reserve to the=selves.
Legislature<. may deprive a corp(ration ,.f its corporate
life, buat it cannot deprive it (,f its real c(r oersonal
pro perty. It may change or alter its ccontract w'ith the
corporation; but it cannot impair the , bli;.ticns
p• it i o nlabe
boteen t}-!: crcporqtior,-v and third oarties . maylace
neIt i  li- itations and restriction s u1pon tho business of
the corporation, but -t cann:t change it ';ure of
business for which,the ch. t r was ,btarni!+. it cannot
impose s. new charter pon tb o hain
/
